What Makes the Collateral Source Rule Different? by Kelly, Michael B.
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review Akron Law Journals
July 2015
What Makes the Collateral Source Rule Different?
Michael B. Kelly
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Torts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kelly, Michael B. (2006) "What Makes the Collateral Source Rule Different?," Akron Law Review: Vol. 39 : Iss. 4 ,
Article 11.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss4/11
KELLYFINAL.DOC 2/26/2007 9:44:54 AM 
 
1171 
WHAT MAKES THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE 
DIFFERENT? 
Michael B. Kelly* 
Paul H. Rubin and Joanna M. Shepherd recently posted a working 
paper that reports a correlation between tort reforms and the rate of fatal 
accidents in the states which adopted those tort reforms.1  They report 
that accidental deaths (excluding motor vehicle accidents) declined in 
the year after tort reforms were adopted (as compared to the year before) 
for a range of reforms: caps on noneconomic damages, caps on punitive 
damages, higher threshold standards for obtaining punitive damages, and 
prejudgment interest.2  But reforms to the collateral source rule had the 
opposite effect; that is, in states that altered the collateral source rule, the 
rate of fatal accidents (excluding motor vehicles) increased in the year 
following the reform.3 
Both findings raise interesting questions.  The first challenges 
conventional wisdom because, in theory, tort liability should decrease 
 
* Professor, University of San Diego School of Law.  J.D. 1983, University of Michigan; M.A. 
1980, University of Illinois-Chicago; B.G.S. 1975, University of Michigan.  I would like to thank 
Gail Heriot, Chris Wonnell, and all the participants at the conference for their assistance with the 
article. 
 1. Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reform and Accidental Deaths, EMORY LAW 
SCH. LAW & ECON. Working Paper Group, Paper No. 05-17, 2006; EMORY PUB. LAW Working 
Paper Group, Paper No. 05-29, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=781424.  This paper was originally prepared in response to their working paper prepared on Aug. 
10, 2005 and revised on Sept 21, 2005.  Some significant details changed in the February version.  I 
hope my efforts to eliminate any comments unique to the earlier version have succeeded. 
 2. Id. at 12.  The data are somewhat more complex than portrayed here.  Before subjecting 
the data to multiple regression analysis designed to control for other factors that might explain 
changes in the rate of fatal accidents, two different approaches to collateral source reform produced 
different results.  Fatal accidents increased when states required courts to offset collateral source 
payments against the damage award, but decreased if the state simply made evidence of collateral 
payments admissible, without requiring offset.  Id.  When controlling for other factors, both types of 
reform to the collateral source rule produced an increase in fatal accidents.  Id. at 16.  Thus, some of 
the decrease following reforms admitting evidence of collateral sources appears to result from 
factors other than tort reform – or other than reform of the collateral source rule.  Adding motor 
vehicle deaths to the data did not substantially change the picture.  Id. at 19. 
 3. Id. at 16. 
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accidents.  Tort liability forces parties engaged in risk-producing 
activities to internalize the costs that the activities impose on those 
adversely affected by the risks they create.  Rational parties should take 
precautions to reduce those risks rather than pay the costs the risks cause 
– at least up to the point that further reductions would cost more than the 
harms they would prevent.  How could reforms that reduce liability, and 
thus force parties to internalize a lower portion of the costs suffered as a 
result of the risks they create, produce a decrease in fatal accidents?  Part 
I below briefly considers this question. 
The second finding, however, is even more paradoxical.  If 
reducing tort liability increases safety, why would reductions achieved 
by the reforms to the collateral source rule differ from reductions 
achieved via other reforms, such as caps on damages or changes to the 
prejudgment interest rules?  The deterrent effect of damage judgments 
depends on the total amount of liability (or expected liability), which 
sets the threshold for precautions a rational party will take.  The specific 
means by which the reduction is achieved arguably should not matter.  
Part II considers this puzzle. 
This paper offers no stunning conclusions – indeed, no conclusions 
at all.  At most, it raises concerns that the data produced by Rubin and 
Shepherd does not serve their purpose very well.  The methodological 
questions raised in Part I are modest.  But as one begins to parse the 
results of the collateral source rule, it becomes harder to credit 
inferences from the data on damage caps.  The suggestion that more 
study is necessary will surprise no one. 
I.  EFFECT OF TORT REFORM ON FATALITY RATES 
Rubin and Shepherd discuss several reasons tort reform might 
reduce accident rates.  They argue tort liability deters accidents 
optimally when five conditions are met: “[D]amages are pecuniary, not 
non-pecuniary; injurers and victims are strangers, and not in any pre-
accident contractual relationship; victims as well as injurers have 
incentives to take optimal precautions; the system operates costlessly; 
and actions of tortfeastors are harmful, not protective.”4 
Where any of these conditions fail, tort liability may impose costs 
on the defendant that exceed the optimal level of deterrence.  For 
instance, attorneys’ fees and other costs make the liability system costly 
for potential defendants, even in cases where their conduct did not cause 
 
 4. Id. at 1. 
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harm to the plaintiff.5  These costs may produce excessive precautions.  
In addition to internalizing the costs of the harms they cause, potential 
defendants internalize some of the costs of the liability system itself, 
thus encouraging precautions that exceed the cost of the harm they might 
generate.  
One may quibble with some elements of this list.  For instance, the 
limitation to pecuniary damages rests on the assumption that people 
would not pay for insurance against pain, distress, and other non-
pecuniary losses, and thus that it is inefficient to deter conduct that 
produces these harms.6  Yet pain, distress, and indignity are real 
consequences of a tortfeasor’s wrong, imposing real costs (though often 
not measured in dollars) on victims.  Encouraging tortfeasors to 
internalize these costs in deciding whether to impose risks on society 
seems plausible.7  Similarly, the ability to negotiate before the accident 
may not necessarily produce a better allocation of risks than the tort 
system.8 
The most interesting condition, however, is the last one.  It reminds 
us that tort liability affects people whose primary service is to reduce 
risks.  Doctors, pharmaceutical producers, and manufacturers of medical 
equipment come immediately to mind.  Reducing the availability of their 
goods and services may make the world less safe rather than safer.  
 
 5. Attorneys’ fees impose large costs, whether defendants litigate weak claims fully or settle 
them to avoid the cost of litigation.  In either event, the costs are not produced by wrongful conduct, 
but are added to the costs of legitimate claims.  Beyond attorneys’ fees, the costs to a business of 
spending time on the litigation can be significant.  For example, every hour a doctor spends on 
discovery or trial is an hour not devoted to patient care and, thus, to earning income.  Unlike 
attorneys’ fees, the latter costs are unlikely to be covered by insurance. 
 6. Rubin & Shepherd, supra note 1, at 7.  Unwillingness to insure suggests that the expected 
cost of insurance against pain, distress, lost joy, and indignity exceeds the expected gain of 
payments for those losses.  This equation does not change when the insurance is purchased through 
the price of goods and services rather than via a first-party insurer.  Nor would it get better when the 
premium also includes the cost of litigation, as it does when insured through defendant’s liability 
insurer. 
 7. The absence of insurance may reflect the fact that policies covering pain are not offered, 
rather than that they are not desired.  One can assume that if people wanted pain policies, insurers 
would offer them.  As the joke goes, if a $20 bill were really on the sidewalk, someone would 
already have picked it up.  Other factors might explain the absence of such policies.  The difficulty 
administering pain insurance may make it an unattractive venture, despite demand.  While this 
suggests that people will not pay enough to overcome the administrative costs imposed by moral 
hazard, it does not necessarily mean that defendants should be free to externalize these costs, or that 
economists should be free to assume that the absence of insurance proves that coverage would be 
inefficient. 
 8. As a Contracts professor, I have considerable faith in negotiations and the efficiency of 
contracts, perhaps a little more than most Torts instructors.  But even among those of us with faith 
in the free market, blind assertions of universal efficiency are rare. 
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Indeed, Rubin and Shepherd’s data on fatal accidents might be largely 
attributable to shortages of care after an accident rather than to the rate at 
which serious accidents occur.9 
But the argument goes a little deeper.  As tort liability affects 
providers of goods or services, it drives up their prices.  Higher prices 
may lead buyers to postpone purchases of new goods and services.  If 
newer products include better safety features, postponing replacement 
purchases may leave consumers subject to the higher risks of their older 
products.  The same could apply to services, as postponing repairs or 
upgrades leaves people with less safe alternatives.  Thus, the tort system 
may deter conduct that would increase safety.10 
 The data Rubin and Shepherd present suggest that some tort 
reforms, particularly those that reduce the magnitude of the liability, 
have exactly this affect. The following questions may aid scholars in 
probing this data and lead to more probative results as further study 
progresses.11 
Two aspects of the study may impair its value.  First, it reports only 
fatal accidents.12  Second, it reports data only for the year immediately 
preceding and immediately following enactment of various tort 
reforms.13  Each choice limits the ability to extrapolate from the data. 
Fatal accidents appear to be a rather small sample of all accidents.  
In addition, they may be the segment least affected by tort reform 
because most wrongful death statutes already limit recovery to pecuniary 
losses, and caps on nonpecuniary damages do not reduce liability for 
fatalities.14  Thus, the decision to rely on data regarding fatal accidents 
seems to have been a practical decision because the data is easier to 
generate. 
Fatal accidents are relevant because a reduction in fatal accidents 
 
 9. Rubin & Shepherd note research suggesting that emergency physicians are drawn to states 
with tort reform, “findings [that] may be particularly relevant for our analysis of accidental deaths, 
for a lack of emergency physicians will result in more accidents that lead to death.”  Rubin & 
Shepherd, supra note 1, at 6. 
 10. See id. at 5.  The ability to price discriminate among states may raise questions.  Medical 
care tends to be state specific.  Perhaps repair services, too, are obtained locally.  Mass-produced 
goods, however, can be obtained by mail or online, making it difficult for a producer to charge less 
in states where tort reforms reduce liability costs.  These improvements should be observed 
nationwide, not just in states with reforms.  In addition, the price adjustments after tort reform may 
be modest if insurance costs depend on nationwide experience. 
 11. See supra note 2. 
 12. See Rubin & Shepherd, supra note 1, at 10. 
 13. See id. at 11. 
 14. If defendants were following the old wisdom that it is cheaper to kill a victim than to 
injure them, a reduction in fatalities might flow from reducing the gap between damages for death 
and damages for severe injuries.  That, however, seems a pretty far-fetched explanation of the data. 
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may reflect a reduction in total accidents.  The overall rate of serious 
accidents probably correlates with the rate of fatal accidents.  In 
addition, efforts to reduce accidents generally should reduce both fatal 
and nonfatal accidents.  A risk producer rarely knows whether the 
accident resulting from the risks it creates will be fatal; its precautions 
probably reduce the aggregate risk.  Thus, the findings may have value, 
but their usefulness is unclear at this time.15 
The second issue, using only data from one year immediately 
preceding and following enactment of various tort reform statutes, 
causes more concern for Rubin and Shepherd’s study and explanatory 
theory.16  First, the study does not test whether the reforms have any 
enduring effect.  Second, Rubin and Shepherd’s explanatory theory 
assumes that the reduction in accidents would follow immediately upon 
enactment of tort reforms 
Tort reforms, once enacted, should continue to affect the liability 
system over their life.  Any reduction in the rate of fatal accidents, 
however brief, is welcome.  But if the theory outlined above is correct, 
the differences between states with and without tort reform should 
remain evident in the second and third year after enactment.  People in 
states with tort reform will experience cheaper access to goods and 
services that enhance safety, producing continued improvements relative 
to people in other states.  Perhaps Rubin and Shepherd are already 
working to analyze longer term effects of tort reforms. 
Including later years is a critical concern given the second issue, the 
assumption that tort reforms immediately affect accident rates.  
Intuitively, it seems unlikely that tort reforms will have an immediate 
affect on defendants’ finances or practices.17  For one thing, the dates 
when tort reform statutes take effect may differ from the date of 
enactment.18  In addition, the reforms may apply prospectively to 
 
 15. Greater availability of emergency care physicians reduces the fatalities resulting from 
accidents without reducing the number of accidents.  If this factor explains much of the effects 
observed, extrapolation to nonfatal accidents may be quite weak.  See supra note 9. 
 16.  Including later years in the data can pose some problems.  As time passes, other changes 
occur that might affect the rate of fatal accidents, for better or worse.  Looking at the period just 
after enactment helps control for those other changes.  A five-year average might obscure the effects 
in the first year, misleading us to believe that tort reform harms safety – or it might exaggerate the 
effects of the first year by including reductions caused by factors unrelated to tort reform.  Still, 
Rubin and Shepherd seem adept at the statistical techniques for isolating the effects of tort reform. 
 17. Even Rubin & Shepherd expressed some surprise that the results were observable within 
one year of enactment.  See Rubin & Shepherd, supra note 1, at 14. 
 18. Rubin and Shepherd refer to “death rate trends in the years before and after the enactment 
of certain tort reforms.”  Rubin & Shepherd, supra note 1, at 11; see also id. at 12 (“enactment,” 
“enacted”), 13 (“enacted”).  Perhaps their language was simply imprecise; they may use the 
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accidents occurring after the effective date or to cases filed after the 
effective date, rather than to all cases tried after the effective date.  Yet 
in the first two cases, defendants continue to pay unreformed awards for 
at least a year after the effective dates.19  Finally, these savings will 
redound to defendants only after insurers incorporate them into their 
premiums. 
Considering the ways tort reform might improve the accident rate, 
an immediate effect in the first year seems quite unlikely.  The theory 
requires that safer goods and services become cheaper, allowing more 
people to use them, thus reducing accident rates.  For that to work, the 
defendant must experience a savings – or at least anticipate a savings – 
that it can pass on to customers.  For most defendants, that will mean 
reduced insurance costs (relative to states without tort reform), though 
for some (who self-insure) it might mean reduced damage awards.20  
Insurers might build expected reductions into their premiums the minute 
the reforms are enacted.  But it seems equally likely that they will 
hesitate long enough to gather actuarial data on the degree that damage 
awards decline, then pass on the savings in rate reductions.  When they 
do, the potential defendants will experience reduced costs.  Those 
savings might be passed on to customers immediately, increasing the 
number of people who can afford these safety enhancements.  As more 
people take advantage of the new opportunities, the rate of fatal 
accidents declines. 
How much can be crammed into the first year after the statute takes 
effect?  Note the assumptions required: (1) That optimism over the effect 
of the reform will cause insurers to lower premiums immediately rather 
than await actual savings; (2) That policy renewal dates will occur early 
enough after the effective date to permit insureds to reap savings in the 
first year, or that similar optimism about reduced premiums produces an 
 
effective dates of tort reform statutes.  The following sentences of text raise problems that apply, to 
some degree, even if the authors used the effective date of the reforms. 
 19. A defendant with a claims-made policy up for renewal immediately after the enactment 
may see an immediate reduction in premiums if the reform applies to claims made after the effective 
date of the statute. 
 20. Reducing the time devoted to lawsuits by corporate personnel might have a more 
immediate effect.  This, however, seems to require a reduced number of lawsuits, not a reduced 
amount at issue in the lawsuits.  Even a modest claim allows plaintiff to conduct discovery, which 
costs employee time and money.  Of course, if tort reform leads more plaintiffs not to sue or leads 
them to settle before discovery, these savings might figure into the calculation.  The immediate 
effect might be modest if the reform applied to accidents occurring after the effective date of the 
statute.  Even an accident the next day is unlikely to reach the discovery stage for several months, so 
savings will occur in the last half of the year.  A law applying to all claims filed after the effective 
date would produce savings sooner, though still only for part of the year. 
6
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immediate price decrease in anticipation of savings; (3) That the 
insureds pass the savings on to their customers;21 (4) That customers 
recognize the savings and decide to upgrade to safer goods and 
services;22 (5) That the upgrades are completed early enough in the year 
that a significant number of fatal accidents do not occur.23 
This is arm-chair scholarship.  Rubin and Shepherd easily might 
respond (patiently or scornfully): “Read the results.  It seems to have 
happened.”  It is unclear why it happened, and why it seems to have 
happened across the board in response to tort reforms in different years 
and different states.  Some data (from other careful, scholarly, 
empiricists) suggests that tort reforms may not have immediate effects.  
For example, William Sage notes that malpractice reforms seem to 
increase the number of physicians in a state, but that the effect begins to 
be felt about three years after the enactment of reforms.24  But that is a 
thin reed upon which to assess the data analyzed by Rubin and 
Shepherd. 
Yet one wonders whether some other mechanism explains the 
observed data.  Might tort reform have an immediate effect on 
consumers, even though it has no (or little) immediate effect on 
providers?  Reducing the amount plaintiffs can recover would logically 
lead potential victims to invest more in safety.  This might involve 
buying safer products, even at higher prices, rather than risk 
uncompensated losses via the tort system.  It might involve conducting 
themselves in a safer manner – reducing risky activity, taking more 
precautions against remote risks, etc.  This kind of change seems likely 
to follow enactment of the law when the publicity is greatest, not 
necessarily its effective date.  It would apply regardless of how 
 
 21. I will not argue that either the insurer or the insured will decide not to reduce prices.  
Competitive pressure should encourage price reductions. Whether local price reductions are 
possible at all in a national or international market is another question, one taken up shortly. 
 22. Advertising of new low prices seems likely to produce relatively quick recognition of the 
lower prices. 
 23. Even when aware of newly affordable prices, some consumers move slowly to make 
significant investments, or to replace their less safe goods with safer goods, unless the less safe 
goods are worn out.  For instance, having once bought a child’s car seat, a price reduction is 
unlikely to persuade parents to buy a second, newer one immediately.  They may bemoan the fact 
that they could have afforded the better model if the price decrease had occurred sooner.  But 
relatively few rush to discard their original seat just because a better one no longer costs more than 
the one they bought. 
 24. William M. Sage, Prof. of Law, Columbia Law School (Remarks at University of San 
Diego, Nov. 3, 2005).  The increase does not stem from an exodus of doctors or from an influx of 
experienced practitioners.  Rather, it arises from delayed retirements and greater attractiveness to 
doctors deciding where to begin their practice. 
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prospective the statute was into later years; any loss prevented by 
consumers would be affected by the reform, even though the effect of 
the statute (in reducing compensation) would be felt years later. 
One might hail this as an indication that tort reform is effective, but 
it is not clear that tort reform is efficient.  Perhaps prevention by 
consumers is less costly than prevention by producers.  Alternatively, 
however, consumers might over-invest in prevention, exaggerating risks, 
misjudging their source, etc.  Producers can reduce the risk for all, rather 
than relying on consumers individually to reduce risks (or not). 
One might argue that prevention by consumers assumes an unlikely 
level of rationality.  Do consumers pay attention to tort reform statutes?  
Do they project the likely implications for themselves?  Do they adjust 
the riskiness of their conduct in response? 
Read Rubin and Shepherd’s data; tort reform apparently has 
reduced the number of fatal accidents.  Skepticism about the mechanism 
proposed by this article seems well judged.  But so is skepticism about 
the mechanism proposed by Rubin and Shepherd, which is similarly 
based on assumptions about rational economic behavior.25  The results 
do not support either hypothesis more strongly than the other.  It is 
simply too soon to conclude that tort reform promotes safety by making 
safety more affordable for consumers. 
  II.  EFFECT OF COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE ON FATALITY RATES 
If one assumes that everything Rubin and Shepherd argue is 
correct, a serious puzzle still remains.  Why would reforming the 
collateral source rule differ from damage caps and other tort reforms?  
Why would fatal accidents increase when that reform was enacted?  The 
effect was observed for two different versions of reform: offsetting 
collateral benefits against damages, and making evidence of collateral 
benefits admissible (apparently without requiring an offset, but leaving 
the jury able to adjust their award on this basis).26  The offset approach 
relates more strongly to increases in fatal accidents. 
Rubin and Shepherd address this topic briefly, noting prior 
evidence of this effect27 and then observing: 
 
 25. See Rubin & Shepherd, supra note 1, at 1.  Rubin and Shepherd originally noted four 
assumptions on which tort liability efficiently deters.  The February revision added a fifth: that 
“victims as well as injurers have incentives to take optimal precautions.”  Id.  This revision permits 
them to claim both mechanisms within their thesis.  The revised paper does not claim that 
precautions by consumers are more efficient than precautions by providers. 
 26. Rubin & Shepherd, supra note 1, at 9. 
 27. Id. at 6 (citing Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Does Medical Malpractice Reform 
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Apparently for this variable, the externality increasing effect outweighs 
the safety increasing effect.  Note that other reforms reduce the amount 
of damage payments for a harmful event, while collateral source 
reform may lead injurers to paying [sic] nothing at all in certain 
circumstances.  Thus, it may not be surprising that this reform has 
larger injury increasing effects than do others.  A more efficient reform 
might be increased subrogation (in which the injured party’s insurance 
company pays the victim and then collects from the injurer) since this 
will maintain incentives for internalization while still avoiding double 
compensation to victims.28 
This is the entire discussion, not an excerpt of it. 
Rubin & Shepherd’s explanation seems plausible, but incomplete.  
For one thing, collateral source limitations often will not eliminate 
plaintiff’s damages.  Collateral sources reduce damages only by the 
amount of plaintiff’s recovery from other sources of compensation, such 
as insurance.  But many losses will be uncompensated.  While many 
Americans have health insurance, disability insurance, covering income 
lost during recovery, is much less common.  Even under health 
insurance, large deductibles, coinsurance, and limitations on coverage or 
procedures may leave substantial expenses uncompensated.  Insurance 
almost never compensates for nonpecuniary losses.  Punitive damages, 
too, would be unaffected.  Thus, the collateral source rule rarely will 
allow “injurers to pay nothing at all . . . .”29 
Reforms to the collateral source rule could eliminate plaintiff’s 
recovery, however, if they undermine a plaintiff’s willingness to sue.  By 
reducing, perhaps severely, the most easily proven aspect of damages, 
reforms to the collateral source rule may make a lawsuit seem like more 
hassle than it is worth.  Larger claims seem likely to be brought: those 
where (uninsured or partially insured) disability is permanent, those 
where pain and suffering loom large, and those where anger runs higher.  
But a plaintiff whose primary loss is pecuniary and who has recovered 
most of it via insurance may decide to waive the rest of the claim or to 
settle it quickly. 
In this regard, a synergy may exist between reforms of the collateral 
source rule and damage caps.  Damage caps may reduce the other 
reasons to file a claim.  If collateral source reform reduces pecuniary 
damages and a damage cap reduces other damages, even more claims 
 
Help States Retain Physicians and Does it Matter (Nov. 3, 2005) (unpublished working paper), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=453481. 
 28. Rubin & Shepherd, supra note 1, at 16. 
 29. Id. 
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may go unfiled or settle early.  The combined effect of the two rules will 
reduce lawsuits far more than either one alone. 
The order in which various reforms are adopted might affect the 
results. Where collateral source reform precedes damage caps, the 
remaining reasons to sue may keep a sufficient flow of litigation to 
encourage substantial precautions by defendants.  But, where damage 
caps have already reduced the incentive for litigation, adding changes to 
the collateral source rule may produce a drastic decline in litigation and, 
thus, a corresponding decline in the incentive for injurers to take 
precautions against the risks they create.  The results reported by Rubin 
and Shepherd do not permit an evaluation of these potential interactions.  
Perhaps they will consider this possibility in future studies. 
At least one more factor deserves brief discussion.  Collateral 
source reform tends to strike at smaller claims, while damage caps strike 
at larger claims.  Because smaller claims substantially outnumber larger 
claims,30 a damage cap will affect relatively few suits.  Tampering with 
the collateral source rule, on the other hand, may affect every lawsuit to 
some extent.  It is likely to deter many suits rather than just a few, 
producing substantial savings to injurers.  Eliminating suits produces 
savings in employee time far in excess of reforms that allow the suit to 
proceed but merely cap damages.  Even if the amount saved per suit is 
relatively small, the volume of suits affected may give this reform a 
much larger impact than damage caps. 
Many object that tort reform limits the recovery of those who 
suffered the greatest losses at the hand of tortfeasors (by capping their 
damages rather than allowing full compensation).  This focus on the 
largest awards benefits a few plaintiffs and their attorneys – who can 
retire on 30% of a very big award, but can barely make a living on 30% 
of many small awards.  Perhaps Rubin and Shepherd will help us refocus 
on the more common smaller claims.  Deterring these seems much more 
significant.  
This mechanism does not differ greatly from that suggested by 
Rubin and Shepherd.  It fleshes out the way suits may disappear. 
In exploring the way collateral source reform might over-deter 
litigation and under-deter risk-creation by injurers, the decision to use 
data for only one year becomes more significant.  To the extent that tort 
reforms discourage plaintiffs from filing suits, that effect seems likely to 
occur in the first year.  If tort reforms apply to all cases tried after the 
 
 30. That is one reason that median damage awards are much lower than average damage 
awards. 
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effective date, settlements or voluntary dismissals seem likely for a large 
number of pending cases.  If the reforms apply to cases filed after the 
effective date, filings would begin to decline almost immediately.  If tort 
reforms applied to accidents that occurred after the effective date, then 
filings would taper off during the year.31  
As a result, defendants would realize an immediate savings from 
these reforms.  Potential defendants save the transaction costs of suits 
when suits are deterred entirely.  No time need be spent investigating 
records to inform their attorneys about the allegations, no time goes into 
preparing documents for discovery or answering interrogatories, no time 
is wasted by lawyers interviewing employees.  The incentive effects are 
immediate and Rubin and Shepherd identify them: an increase in fatal 
accidents, apparently related to the decrease in precautions potential 
defendants take. 
This differs substantially from damage caps.  Damage caps will 
produce savings, if at all, in future years, as cases come to trial.32  
Defendants may not know whether particular precautions will prevent a 
smaller claim or a larger one.  Precautions may prevent accidents, with 
only luck determining whether they will be severe or minor.  As a result, 
defendants retain an incentive to minimize total accidents.  A damage 
cap, therefore, might not save some defendants a dime, as they might be 
unlucky enough to cause a really serious accident.  Larger companies 
may have enough volume to expect that they will cause some large 
damages in the future, but a smaller company may have no basis upon 
which to book the savings immediately.  The prospect looks better, but 
until the company experiences a savings, either in judgments or in 
premiums, it doesn’t know whether it can reduce precautions.  These 
reductions in precautions will occur in future years, as experience 
mounts. 
This leaves a particularly gruesome possibility: perhaps the 
reduction in fatal accidents following damage caps is temporary.  Once 
real reductions are felt, precautions will be reduced, and fatalities will 
rise.  This mirrors the results from the collateral source rule.  Rubin and 
Shepherd may have discovered that the collateral source reform 
 
 31. Until the statute of limitations ran on injuries that occurred before the effective date, 
filings would remain undeterred by the reforms.  But filings for new accidents would not keep pace 
with prior years, causing a gradual reduction in filings. 
 32. Settlements of cases that will be governed by the damage caps also produce savings, as 
lawyers negotiate amounts with an eye on the likely recovery at trial.  Depending on the 
retroactivity of the tort reform, these savings may be realized in future years rather than 
immediately.  Perhaps the incentive to take precautions disappears immediately.  The cap will apply 
to future accidents, even if it does not apply to past accidents. 
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undermines the incentive to take precautions that will minimize 
accidents.  But if the lead time differs between the two types of reforms, 
their data may have missed the fact that, in subsequent years, damage 
caps may have exactly the same effect.  The timing of the effect, not the 
direction of the change, may differ between the two types of reforms. 
These suggestions are no more than hypotheses.  Empiricists such 
as Rubin and Shepherd deserve praise for trying to test hypotheses such 
as these against actual data.  Perhaps these thoughts will help Rubin and 
Shepherd refine their approach in the next round of analyses of their 
data.  In the meantime, these doubts should dampen the enthusiasm for 
tort reforms.  Whatever the case for them, it seems too soon to place a 
reduction in fatal accidents among the justifications. 
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